Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs): Lessons from Baltimore’s Port Covington

Andrew Debraggio

Abstract:  Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) are a relatively new tool for urban policymakers. CBAs provide a framework for communities and developers to agree on shared goals for development sites and can help reduce the risk of litigation. The CBA agreed over Baltimore's Port Covington site shows the unique constraints communities in struggling cities face when seeking a CBA, but also demonstrates the efficacy of CBAs regardless of city. 

I. Introduction

A Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) is a relatively new tool in the urban policy landscape. CBAs are agreements between local community members and developers that typically provide for community priorities (parks, affordable housing, local hiring requirements) in exchange for increased collaboration and a diminished risk of litigation. In some areas, such as Milwaukee, CBAs have legislative backing (McKean 2015, 135). However, because many areas do not, CBAs are on uncertain legal grounds. Any CBA – regardless of whether it is legislative or negotiated – has to confront these legal gray zones. Especially for negotiated CBAs, it is uncertain who would have standing to sue to enforce the agreement if the developer is shirking its side of the deal (McKean 2015, 139-140). For legislative CBAs, there is a constitutionality concern; in other words, the benefits a CBA accrues to the local community may be an illegal exaction from the state because it might lack an essential nexus (McKean 2015, 140). In sum, these uncertain legal grounds suggest that CBAs have a fundamental weakness. However, a court has never ruled on CBAs, so stakeholders have little precedent upon which they lean if a controversy arises (McKean 2015).

Standing is critical for both sides of the negotiating table. Who represents development, and who represents communities? Baltimore’s Port Covington shows how complicated these agreements can be absent government representatives and community input. When Baltimore formed plans for a CBA in 2016, Port Covington had no residents. McKean (2015) summarizes the advantages of a CBA best, noting a CBA commit developers to consider low-income residents and community groups, can help hold developers responsible if they err, and makes it easier to approve development projects by removing potential sources of litigation. In short, it allows both sides – developers and existing residents – to win commitments from the other player. External costs of development matter, and CBAs create opportunities for Pareto improvements.

Any development is bound to have externalities and impact nearby communities, and that trend persists with the CBA in Port Covington. Because of the site’s immense public financial support, a CBA was appropriate even though development there would not push any existing residents out. (Fuld 2018). Though many direct effects, such as displacement, are bound to be less acute in a struggling city, a CBA is still a useful tool for development, especially when we factor in secondary effects. Baltimore, particularly the neighborhoods of the “South Baltimore Six” (SB6), could attract additional residents as a result of the development at Port Covington. This might result in displacement of long-term residents through increased rent and housing prices. These spillover effects mean that Port Covington’s impact will be felt citywide.

Baltimore, nicknamed “Charm City,” is not a thriving metropolis like New York or San Francisco. As such, it is a useful case study for analyzing the options available to policymakers in lagging urban areas. Efforts to redevelop Baltimore have resulted in a power struggle between developers and the city’s citizenry. In the midst of economic decline, cities can struggle to exact concessions from private enterprise; the city often has a weaker hand because it needs each development project more than its thriving counterparts. The SB6 and Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development (BUILD), however,  demonstrate the efficacy of local groups in setting and guiding development. As exemplified in the Port Covington CBA, organizations across Baltimore show the importance of local input on development even – if not especially – in relatively struggling cities. Additionally, BUILD’s efforts to extract concessions on the Tax Increment Financing (TIF) portion of the deal demonstrate how difficult it is to negotiate in the context of a non-thriving city. In pursuing a CBA and facilitating community engagement, Baltimore and its citizens demonstrate how stakeholder buy-in for urban redevelopment can be realized in struggling urban areas just as it has been realized in thriving cities like New York and Los Angeles.

This study situates Baltimore in the broader context of shrinking cities and briefly explains the history of zoning in the city. After highlighting the efficacy of CBAs writ large, this analysis focuses on the Port Covington CBA and related TIF. It then proceeds to make policy conclusions stemming from this particular agreement that other shrinking cities can look to as they pursue future development.

Baltimore as a Shrinking City

The Midwest is what most immediately think of when they hear or read about struggling cities. President Trump evoked cities like Detroit when he spoke of “rusted-out factories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation” in his inaugural address. On the shore of the Chesapeake Bay, however, is another shrinking city. Since the mid-20th century, Baltimore experienced a similar decline to that of cities most often found in the Midwest. Familiarizing oneself with this particular city’s decline in the context of shrinking cities is vital to understanding both how the CBA in Port Covington came to be and what it could mean for other shrinking cities.

Population decline amid manufacturing loss is common in shrinking cities. It is widely accepted that Detroit deteriorated alongside the decline of the car manufacturing industry during the late 20th century into the 21st, culminating in 2013 with its bankruptcy in the face of tens of billions of dollars of debt (Davey and Walsh 2013). Jobs left Detroit as car manufacturing left Michigan, and Detroit’s population declined as its workers left. In 1950, per the U.S. Census, Detroit was America’s fifth largest city with 1,849,568 million people. As of a July 2017 estimate from the U.S. Census Bureau, Detroit’s population makes it the 23rd largest city in the country with 673,104 inhabitants. Baltimore experienced a similar decline. In 1950, Baltimore was the sixth largest city in the country with 949,708 residents (U.S. Census, 1998). As of July 2017, it was ranked 30th on the U.S. Census Bureau’s list of largest cities with 611,648 residents. As in Detroit, industry left Baltimore in the second half of the 20th century, leading to the depletion of manufacturing sites like Sparrows Point – once the largest steel-producing plant in the world – which employed around 31,000 people in its heyday (UMBC). This vibrancy is now a relic, as a shrinking city necessarily means a decline in jobs as well as residents.

With this outflow, a struggling city must cope with less tax revenue, more empty and blighted lots, and other associated ills. Detroit has tens of thousands of vacant lots and buildings; so many, in fact, that local leaders like Mayor Mike Duggan opted to create the Detroit Land Bank Authority to oversee almost 100,000 parcels of land (Gallagher 2017). The poor physical landscape mirrors the economic situation of many Detroiters, with as many as 35.7% of city residents living in poverty (Data USA 2018). Baltimore also struggles with widespread heroin usage. Dubbed the “country’s heroin capital,” the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the city’s health department estimate that 10 percent of Baltimore residents are addicted to heroin (Quinones 2015). A shrinking city produces serious consequences for its residents. Though not geographically contiguous to cities in the Midwest that are commonly associated with decline, Baltimore has every other factor that indicates it is a part of this shrinking city narrative.

Placing Baltimore within this context allows us to determine the macroscopic constraints community organizations face with the Port Covington development. Logan and Molotch (1976) emphasize the role of development in a city, nothing that the “growth imperative” limits local policymakers’ choices (310). This constraint places shrinking cities in a particularly tight bind. Growth is uncertain, but decades of decline make growth all the more vital. Wilson (2007) notes that struggling cities, in particular, need private enterprise to create consumption-oriented outlets and other attractions to mitigate their declines. Thriving cities and struggling cities alike still compete for investment, but in shrinking cities, the deck is stacked against local communities trying to shape the course of development.

Zoning, Baltimore, and Port Covington

Zoning is one of the most important levers cities may use to organize and promote development. Most cities try to strike a balance between overregulation and deregulation, seeking policies that promote ordered growth. Schleicher (2015) makes clear that zoning can place undue restrictions on a city’s growth. Some economists criticize zoning as a gatekeeping mechanism that limits development and inhibits the free market, but the 1970s solidified its use in cities across the country (Schleicher 2015). Baltimore’s 1971 Zoning Code set the course of development for the city until 2016, when the city’s mayor and council signed a replacement paradigm into law (City of Baltimore). It is important to trace the course of zoning in Baltimore in order to place the Port Covington development within its local context.

The 1971 Zoning Ordinance set the course of Port Covington’s (lapsed) development over several decades. The site, with its marine and railroad economies, was industrial. In the 1970s, all of these businesses left Port Covington (Maryland Historical Society). In 1987, Port Covington was subject to an Urban Renewal Plan in which large swaths of the site were rezoned from heavy industrial to light industrial uses (Baltimore City Government). Accordingly, CSX Transportation, which owned much of the land on the site, worked with the city to make part of Port Covington an industrial office park. Baltimore Sun journalist Natalie Sherman noted that the city’s habit of adjusting zoning and related rules for Port Covington continued into the 21st century (Sherman 2015). In 2000, zoning changes allowed major retailers, including Wal-Mart and Sam's Club, to open in Port Covington, and the newest player on the scene is Under Armour (UA) CEO Kevin Plank (Sherman 2015).

Plank’s interest in the site dovetailed with Baltimore’s overhaul of its zoning code in 2016. The Citizens Planning and Housing Association, a civic organization in Baltimore, approves this zoning update. A significant part of the update involved emphasizing mixed-use, transit-oriented, and healthy neighborhoods (Thorton et al. 2013). Additionally, the TransForm Baltimore zoning ordinance created the “Port Covington Zoning District,” which, according to the City of Baltimore’s Council Bill, is meant to transition Port Covington into a vibrant mixed-use site. This update provided flexibility for the site’s future, which is now being realized through the efforts of Plank and others. Plank’s holding company (the aptly named Plank Industries) purchased 27 properties totaling 171 acres on the site (O’Connell 2016). This amounts to around two-thirds of Port Covington, which provides more than enough land to build a new headquarters for UA and spur other development.

Baltimore radically overhauled its zoning ordinances to respond to its citizens’ concerns and try to encourage development. The city’s move was similar to that of its southern neighbor, Washington, D.C., which also adopted a new zoning regime in 2016. What both of these moves have in common, despite the different economic contexts in which they occurred, is that each sought to modernize decades-old codes. In 2017, Baltimore Magazine journalist Ron Cassie observed that Baltimore’s zoning update signaled that the city is open for business and ready for investment, new jobs, and opportunities like the TIF project in Port Covington.

Port Covington’s Redevelopment

Port Covington has tremendous potential for redevelopment. A June 2016 draft of the Baltimore Planning Commission’s Port Covington Master Plan highlights its 260 acres of land, three miles of waterfront, and future as the home of anchor tenant UA. However, there are drawbacks to investing quickly in the area. Specifically, the Baltimore Planning Commission notes that I-95, like a scar on the land, cuts the site off from the rest of Baltimore, but it also acknowledges the highway’s potential to aid shipping and receiving when the site is complete. Additionally, the Commission notes that waterfront real estate is prone to flooding risks. Nevertheless, UA CEO Plank has tapped this decades-long underutilized site for billions of dollars of investment.

The scope of the Port Covington redevelopment plan is massive. Spearheaded by Plank’s Sagamore Development, which co-owns much of the site with the Goldman Sachs Urban Investment Group and Weller Development Co., the Port Covington area will soon be home to UA’s global headquarters (Cohn 2018). In line with existing and future development, UA plans to build a 50-acre campus in Port Covington (Cohn 2018). For example, Nick’s Fish House, the Sagamore Spirit Distillery, Rye Street Tavern, and South Point, which is a pop-up music venue, have already begun attracting visitors to the former industrial zone (Weller Development Company). In 2018, a decades-old printing plant became the Baltimore Sun’s new headquarters (Simmons 2018), and three cybersecurity firms signed on to open operations in Port Covington (Mirabella and Cohn 2018). In addition to UA offices inhabiting the former Sam’s Club, a shared work site and UA research facility have also transformed a former transportation garage in the area (Cohn 2018).

In sum, development is continuing apace for Port Covington. Kevin Plank – who grew up in Kensington, Maryland and attended the University of Maryland – is seeking to leave an indelible imprint on his state’s largest city (O’Connell 2016). Further, Plank is uniquely well-positioned to drive development because he owns much of the site. Given the potential for rapid change and influx of investment, it is unsurprising that local community groups in South Baltimore have strong opinions on the development. Concerned communities in Baltimore have actively voiced their qualms to powerful developers, and they seek financial and social commitments to ensure that the fruits of investment help all Baltimoreans. CBAs can provide a useful framework for locals and developers to establish terms and agree on benefits. Before analyzing the Port Covington CBA in detail, however, it is necessary to understand both what CBAs are and what traits comprise a successful CBA.

II. So, What are CBAs, Really? Pros, Cons, and Analysis

CBAs are an emerging tool for communities to gain extractions from developers. Some have legislative backing, like the aforementioned example in Milwaukee; others are analogous to Coasian bargaining, with affected communities negotiating directly with private developers. The Port Covington CBA falls into the latter bucket (McKean, 135). On their faces, CBAs set a framework for community priorities like local employment requirements, provide funding for local organizations, and ensure developers can continue their work without protracted legal battles from local advocates.

Community development experts broadly recognize the Staples Center in Los Angeles as the first successful CBA (McKean 2015, 142). Negotiated in 2001, this CBA propelled the development of over 100 affordable housing units, drew in hundreds of thousands of dollars for the Figueroa Corridor Community Land Trust (a local parking program in car-centric Los Angeles), and generated funding for local job-training and hiring initiatives (McKean 2015, 142). The Los Angeles-based CBA delivered a vibrant arena for professional sports, concerts, and other events while also ensuring that the local community could enjoy the rising tide of development. Over 30 groups participated in the CBA, and the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for Economic Justice negotiated the agreement without legislative intervention, winning significant benefits for its constituents (McKean 2015, 141-142). This CBA is an exemplar, but it is worth judging it in the context of its unique geographic and economic situation. Unlike Detroit, Milwaukee, and Baltimore, Los Angeles is not a shrinking city, and thus, it does not face the unique constraints of poorer urban areas.

CBAs face an additional practical concern: the potential “chilling effect” that could deter development because of higher investment costs (McKean 2015, 140). This unintended consequence is one of the most salient concerns for shrinking cities. Regardless of the growth prospects of the city in question, the legal challenges are more or less consistent across cities. The major differences emerge based on whether the CBA was enacted through legislative intent or private bargaining. The prospect of scaring away development, however, is a unique concern for policymakers in shrinking cities. For example, a 2016 Detroit ordinance enshrined CBAs in legislation but limited the scope to projects equal to or greater than $75 million and stipulated that a developer is not required to enter into a CBA with any organization other than the city’s government itself. “[t]he Developer shall not be required to enter into a legally binding agreement with any individual or organization other than the City” (Ordinance No. 35-15, 2016). The city, in effect, guarantees it holds all the cards in a CBA for large projects and pushes out community groups. Therefore, if Detroit thinks a project is essential for the city’s development – even if the developer is not adequately providing benefits to the affected communities – the city can push the investment forward because enforcement is strictly under its purview. Conversely, CBAs and the process of negotiating a CBA can be captured by corporatist interests, which would result in fewer concessions from developers.

Despite the utility of the Staples Center CBA, Milwaukee may serve as a more relevant comparison to Baltimore than Los Angeles. Between 1960 and 1999, according to the Milwaukee Business Journal’s Pete Millard, the city’s population shrunk by 20%. Milwaukee, like Baltimore, is a shrinking city. Accordingly, the Wisconsin city was so concerned about alienating developers and inhibiting development that the city council did not even vote on a CBA for its Park East site; instead, the county had to step in and apply a CBA on the portion of the site it owned (McKean 2015, 143-144). This unusual dynamic occurred in large part because the city was concerned about corporate blowback and felt it lacked sufficient leverage to pursue a CBA. McKean (2015) asserts that the county had more success in negotiating a CBA because it was less influenced by the developer and business interests. Los Angeles shows what CBAs can be at their best; Detroit, Milwaukee and Baltimore demonstrate the headwinds CBAs face in shrinking cities.

III. Port Covington’s CBA and TIF

Figure 1: Timeline of the negotiated changes affecting the Port Covington CBA agreement

In any shrinking city, one of the biggest conundrums is oversight of the decision making process regarding use of vacant and abandoned land. The Port Covington CBA, with its interplay between community groups, city government, and developers, is a potential model for CBAs in similarly struggling cities. By no means, however, is it perfect. Fuld (2018) even asserts that the Port Covington CBA may not qualify as a true CBA because it involved insufficient interaction between the developer and the community. In short, Fuld (2018) believes that because there are no residents who specifically live at the Port Covington site, this CBA – agreed to through adjacent communities instead – cannot be seen as an example of such an agreement. This conclusion does not properly consider both the murky legal status of CBAs and the peculiar context of CBAs in a shrinking city. Moreover, it does not account for Plank’s ownership of much of the site, which made it easier for him to pursue development regardless of whether a CBA was in place. CBAs do not always rest on solid legal grounds, but they are used throughout the country for the potential benefits they can accrue. Furthermore, CBAs in shrinking cities already face an uphill battle given the uncertain economic conditions of their local contexts. Therefore, nearly any agreement – especially one that holds the economic promise of the Port Covington CBA – is a potential boon for affected communities.

The SB6 and BUILD’s Port Covington CBA is a significant win for South Baltimore. Six communities comprise the SB6: Brooklyn, Cherry Hill, Curtis Bay, Lakeland, Mt. Winans, and Westport (Port Covington 2017). Working on behalf of the city, BUILD did much of the negotiating for the final CBA (Fuld 2018). Upon reaching an agreement with Sagamore Development Corporation on May 23, 2017, the SB6 became the SB7 (Port Covington 2017). A unique aspect of this agreement is the lack of an existing community in Port Covington. Unlike some other CBAs (like one negotiated between Columbia University and West Harlem in New York City), Port Covington’s does not feature residents who would be physically displaced or otherwise harmed by the development (Foster and Glick 2017). This is an important addendum to CBAs in the context of struggling cities. Although cities like Detroit, Milwaukee and Baltimore have less leverage because of their economic situations, their developments can occur in localities without residents.

The affordable housing stipulations in the CBA should help mitigate some of these knock-on effects, and the inclusion of parks and other public spaces in Port Covington help foster community in South Baltimore (Marton et al. 2016). Baltimore residents stand to benefit in some ways from this project, even in the event of potentially negative spillover effects as existing residents and Port Covington workers face increased housing costs.

In the face of these potential externalities and impending development, the SB6 was able to convince Sagamore Development Corporation to commit to provide funding for local initiatives and projects. Per the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Sagamore commits to providing $39 million to the SB6 and at least an additional $10 million for citywide initiatives. This funding is vital; Keisa Allen, president of the Westport Neighborhood Association claims that the money kept Baltimore communities afloat (Cassie 2017). A summary of terms of the Port Covington MOU notes that the benefits for local communities go beyond mere financing for educational and associated projects. Sagamore agreed to build affordable housing equal to 20% of all residential units at the site with at least 60% specifically in Port Covington, and it seeks to utilize Low-Income Housing Tax Credits for other properties. Furthermore, the agreement includes a requirement that 30% of hires be local residents and establishes a Workforce Opportunities Center to facilitate hiring alongside apprenticeship programs and a generous minimum wage.

Skeptical community leaders remain leery of Sagamore’s commitment to follow through on its agreements. Though the final MOU, which amended an already agreed TIF, doubled Sagamore’s affordable housing requirement from 10% to 20%, this provision is not binding for other developers (Fuld 2018). Sagamore also did not commit to spreading out these affordable units within Port Covington, meaning all affordable housing on the site could be consigned to a small corner of the development (Fuld 2018, 304-306). A myriad other policy concerns could be raised, but the central sticking point for opponents of the final CBA is the perceived lack of sufficient enforcement mechanisms and specifics.

The prospect of a TIF heavily influenced the final MOU for the Port Covington CBA. Indeed, much of the public furor over the Port Covington development comes not from the parts of the CBA that realized the SB7, but from this financing scheme (Fuld 2018, 287-288). After their experience with Baltimore’s Harbor Point TIF, community advocates were ready to fight for a better deal. The 2013 Harbor Point development went forward without a CBA or other substantial community commitments. According to BUILD organizer Libby Cohen, the developer essentially told the organization: “‘You can do whatever you want, I will get my TIF’” (Fuld 2018, 292-293). Recognizing the existence of this environment of perceived “giveaways” to developers is critical to understanding the TIF negotiations pertaining to Port Covington. When Port Covington’s TIF came under consideration, Baltimore residents who were tired of developer incentives wanted to win better concessions for themselves and their communities.

Port Covington’s TIF was divisive from the beginning. Proponents of the $660 million measure believed it would spur development and job growth, while opponents believed it was an unnecessary public expenditure subsidizing the already wealthy (Broadwater 2016). Despite state lawmakers’ reassurances, opponents feared that Baltimore’s public schools would lose state aid because the TIF would portray a misleadingly positive image of the city’s financial situation without contributing to the budget (Broadwater 2016). Debate over the TIF ultimately splintered the three prominent community organizations negotiating with Sagamore.

Only BUILD signed on to the final agreement; other stakeholders, including People Organized for Responsible Transformation, Tax Subsidies, and TIFs (PORT3) and Build Up Baltimore, both walked away from the negotiations after they determined the proposed deal was unacceptable (Fuld 2018, 296). BUILD’s mindset, however, reflects an ability to adjust to the difficult conditions for economic development in Baltimore. The organization understood they did not have much bargaining power and would almost certainly accept any deal with Sagamore (Fuld 2018, 302). Realism is needed for community groups in a shrinking city. Growth is far from certain, and development is essential to attracting residents, jobs, and the larger tax base that accompanies both. The Baltimore City Council President at the time of the TIF approval, Bernard C. “Jack” Young, emphasized that the city did not want Under Armour to leave Baltimore (Broadwater 2016). Baltimore needed this development and feared the negative economic repercussions of failing to work with UA and its CEO.

BUILD also recognized the difficult circumstances it faced but viewed its role as central to negotiating a CBA that included favorable terms for the community. (Fuld 2018, 302). As previously mentioned, the final MOU included a 10 percentage point increase in affordable housing compared to the original agreement (Fuld 2018, 304). Furthermore, the final MOU added enforcement capabilities, including requirements that Sagamore fund a local hiring coordinator and establish an advisory committee (Fuld 2018, 310). Ultimately, judging the success of a TIF requires a long-term view; if the development goes largely as planned and benefits accrue to the local communities, everyone wins.

A CBA relies upon trust; communities must have a good-faith belief that developers will not shirk their commitments, and developers need confidence that the public will not impede their investments. An implicit, but nevertheless integral, aspect of the Port Covington CBA is the figure behind it all: the UA CEO. Plank, at the opening of the Foundry, a skills-building workshop in Port Covington, said, “We want to shine a light on this great city of Baltimore. [. . .] I love this city. I love my company. I believe in this city. I believe in what’s going to happen” (O’Connell 2016). Plank’s sentiments echo that of another private businessmen who prioritized community investment. Quicken Loans owner Dan Gilbert, who was born in Detroit and grew up in the suburbs of the city, believes that “[a]nything can be created in Detroit. Down here, like in basketball, you can create your own shot” (Austen 2014). Backing up his words with dollars, Gilbert moved the headquarters of his company into Detroit and bought property after property downtown, much like Plank did in Port Covington (Austen 2014). People like Plank and Gilbert show a path forward for shrinking cities. It may be hard for shrinking cities to replicate these projects – not every city can wait for a wealthy figure connected and committed to its revival – but they can glean lessons from their CBA experiences. In CBAs – with their lack of legal standing – trust is integral, and communities may find it easier to trust a corporation led by an individual who has a long-standing relationship with the region. However, Plank cannot expect blind faith from Baltimoreans. Ronald Reagan used the Russian proverb “[t]rust, but verify;” the Port Covington CBA exemplifies this vital second component within the proper shrinking city context.

IV. Policy Implications and Conclusion

The Port Covington CBA shows both the limitations and the possibilities of community-based intervention regarding development within a shrinking city. In the midst of an uncertain economic future, policymakers have constrained options for stimulating growth. A shrinking city like Detroit, Milwaukee, or Baltimore needs to grow, and everyone – including the developers – knows it.

Port Covington signals the importance of local input and realism to policymakers in shrinking cities. Even if developers seek to build on a tract of land that is uninhabited, like Port Covington, there will be externalities that affect the city, as a whole, and nearby communities, in particular. Allowing development without community benefits is neither good policy nor responsible city-making; extractions can, and should, be pursued. Nevertheless, negotiators should approach these discussions with a realistic awareness about what is possible. Policymakers in shrinking cities need to seek investment even more than those in coastal supercities. However, it is also more important for the former to willingly compromise. Finally, it helps, though it is not always possible, to have a local figure serve as the face of the development.

Baltimore is undeniably a shrinking city. Though it is just a short train ride away from the booming Washington, D.C. region, it struggles with population decline and job loss. Baltimore recently revamped its zoning paradigm, and with it created a special district for Port Covington. Port Covington is the centerpiece for Plank’s new UA global headquarters, and this future growth will have spillover effects – both positive and negative – for the city. The Port Covington CBA is not perfect, but it shows other policymakers in shrinking cities how such an agreement can be realized. Depending on local constraints, other shrinking cities should consider pursuing CBAs as a means of producing substantial community benefits.